Common Law Decision-Making, Constitutional Shadows, and the Value of Consistency: The Jurisprudence of William F. Batchelder by Friedman, Lawrence
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
Volume 12
Number 1 University of New Hampshire Law Review Article 3
January 2014
Common Law Decision-Making, Constitutional
Shadows, and the Value of Consistency: The
Jurisprudence of William F. Batchelder
Lawrence Friedman
New England School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr
Part of the Common Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The University of New Hampshire Law Review by an authorized editor of University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Repository Citation
Lawrence Friedman, Common Law Decision-Making, Constitutional Shadows, and the Value of Consistency: The Jurisprudence of William
F. Batchelder, 12 U.N.H. L. REV. 1 (2014), available at http://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr/vol12/iss1/3
1 
Common Law Decision-Making,  
Constitutional Shadows, and the Value of Consistency: 






INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 
I. THE DECISIONS ...................................................................................... 5 
   A.   Bonte v. Bonte ............................................................................ 5 
   B.   Aranson v. Schroeder ................................................................. 9 
   C.   Are Justice Batchelder's Positions in Bonte and  
  Aranson Consistent? .................................................................. 14 
II. BONTE, ARANSON, AND THE METHODS OF COMMON LAW 
          DECISION-MAKING ................................................................................ 15 
   A.   The Method of Philosophy ........................................................ 16 
   B.   The Methods of History and Custom ......................................... 17 
   C.   The Method of Sociology .......................................................... 18 
III. ACCOUNTING FOR CONSTITUTIONAL SHADOWS ................................... 21 




This is an essay about common law decision-making, with an emphasis 
on the value of consistency as it relates to claims about the legitimacy of 
judicial lawmaking.  The legitimacy of judicial lawmaking is ever an issue, 
particularly, of course, in the cases at the margins—those instances in which 
precedent points the court in no obviously correct direction, a choice must be 
made between plausible alternative paths, and “a decision one way or the 
other,” as Benjamin Cardozo observed, “will count for the future, will 
advance or retard, sometimes much, sometimes little, the development of the 
law.”1 
                                                
 * Professor of Law, New England School of Law.  I served as a law clerk to Associate 
Justice William F. Batchelder of the New Hampshire Supreme Court from August 1995 until 
Justice Batchelder’s retirement; I continued to serve as a law clerk to Justice Batchelder’s 
successor, John T. Broderick, Jr., until August 1997.  Thanks are due to my colleague Jordy 
Singer, for his very helpful comments and suggestions; and to Elisabeth Baker, for her 
excellent research assistance. 
 1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 165 (1921).  As Israeli 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon Barak has noted, these are the cases in which “judges 
must consider whether it is appropriate to change the judicial precedent itself, by expanding or 
restricting the existing case law or overturning an old precedent.”  AHARON BARAK, THE 
JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 10 (2006). 
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These are often the cases in which a court must address what 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Chief Justice Edward F. Hennessey 
called “[t]he most acute of all tensions”—namely, “the confrontation . . . 
between objectivity and the judge’s personal philosophy.”2  The hope is that, 
when faced with the opportunity to create or reject precedent, the court will 
show due respect for the value of consistency—for the value that inheres in a 
predictable and logical approach to the interpretation, application, 
articulation, and extrapolation of legal rules.  Consistency suggests that 
judicial decision-making is based upon principle rather than passion, and its 
presence or absence accordingly contributes to the public’s view of the 
legitimacy of particular instances of judicial lawmaking.3 
In exploring the contribution of consistency to the legitimacy of judicial 
lawmaking, my focus is on two discrete cases from the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court—Bonte v. Bonte4 and Aranson v. Schroeder5—in which one 
justice—William F. Batchelder—played a significant role, joining the dissent 
in the first and writing for the majority in the second.  Each case concerned 
the question whether the court should, for the first time, recognize a 
particular cause of action in tort.  In the former case, Justice Batchelder did 
not approve a new cause of action; in the latter, he did.  What I seek to 
examine here is whether these cases provide an example of the kind of 
inconsistency that necessarily undermines legitimacy, or whether a principled 
distinction between the decisions suggests an interpretive approach which 
could be usefully applied in other cases in which litigants seek recognition of 
novel causes of action. 
I have chosen these particular cases, and this particular justice, 
deliberately.  After graduation from law school and a trial court clerkship, I 
clerked for Justice Batchelder, and so I have some sense of how these 
decisions came to be.  It follows that my analysis here is in no way empirical.  
To the contrary, this is a fairly impressionistic account of two discrete 
instances of common law decision-making and how one court—how one 
judge—navigated the critical questions presented in those instances, and 
                                                
 2. EDWARD F. HENNESSEY, JUDGES MAKING LAW 63 (1994).  As David A. Strauss put it: 
“There is an old question: does a judge decide how a case will come out, and then find a 
justification in the law?  Or does the judge approach the case with no strong prior inclination 
and follow the legal materials where they lead?”  David A. Strauss, What Were They 
Thinking?, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 184 (Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001). 
 3. Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting that, while 
“[l]aws promulgated by the Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc,” the 
law as declared by the courts ought to be “principled, rational, and based upon reasoned 
distinctions”). 
 4. 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992). 
 5. 671 A.2d 1023 (N.H. 1995). 
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what that may say more generally about the value of consistency in common 
law decision-making.  This essay is microhistorical in the sense that it may 
reveal “in fine-grained detail how larger processes operate, how [a] case 
serves as a useful hypothesis for exploring other cases.”6 
At the same time, attorneys who in some future case will be making 
arguments about whether a new cause of action should be adopted (or 
rejected) would be paying attention to the same concerns at play in the two 
cases that I discuss herein—that is, to the various factors a court considers in 
determining whether to adopt a new cause of action.  In other words, it is 
likely that the attorneys seeking to press the claim for recognition of a new 
cause of action, or to oppose it, would be looking at cases like Bonte and 
Aranson and thinking about them in similar ways, with an eye toward 
extracting some guidance about how a court might proceed going forward. 
It may be helpful at this point to have some sense of Justice Batchelder 
and his tenure on the New Hampshire Supreme Court.  Born in Plymouth, 
New Hampshire, the judge had served in the U.S. Navy in World War II and 
returned to earn degrees from the University of New Hampshire and Boston 
University Law School.7  He worked in private practice until Governor 
Walter Peterson appointed him to the Superior Court in 1970.8  Governor 
Hugh Gallen appointed him eleven years later to the Supreme Court, from 
which he stepped down in November 1995.9  
By reputation Justice Batchelder was compared, with good reason, to 
United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan.10  Like Brennan, 
Batchelder had an abiding interest in the role of the judge as protector of 
individual rights and liberties.11  In a 1977 Harvard Law Review article, 
Justice Brennan urged state courts to view their own constitutions as a source 
of rights and liberties whose protections might extend “beyond those 
                                                
 6. See John Walton, James F. Brooks & Christopher R. N. DeCorse, Introduction to 
SMALL WORLDS: METHODS, MEANING & NARRATIVE IN MICROHISTORY 5 (John Walton, James 
F. Brooks & Christopher R. N. DeCorse eds., 2008) (describing microhistorical studies “in the 
best of circumstances”); cf. Jill Lepore, Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on 
Microhistory and Biography, 88 AM. J. HIST. 129, 133 (2001) (describing “microhistory” as 
founded on the assumption that, “however singular a person’s life may be, the value of 
examining it lies not in its uniqueness, but in its exemplariness, in how that individual’s life 
serves as an allegory for broader issues affecting the culture as a whole”).  
 7. Walter L. Murphy, Tribute to Justice William F. Batchelder, 37 N.H.B.J. 7, 7 (1996).   
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  I clerked for Justice Batchelder in the last few months of his tenure on the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court.  In his letter offering me the job, he suggested that his current 
clerks wanted to get together with me for lunch and, he wrote, “[s]o you will be completely at 
ease during the luncheon, all they want to do is to look you over and size you up.”  Letter from 
William F. Batchelder to author (May 17, 1994) (on file with author). 
 10. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 8. 
 11. See id. 
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required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”12  The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court, and Justice Batchelder in particular, took a 
similar view and soon emerged at the vanguard of the phenomenon known as 
the “new judicial federalism,”13 the move toward resolving individual rights 
and liberties issues under the state constitutional counterparts to the 
protections contained in the federal Bill of Rights. 14   That the New 
Hampshire Constitution and its Declaration of Rights were important to 
Justice Batchelder was plain to anyone who studied his decisions involving 
individual rights, equal protection, and criminal procedure.15   
Indeed, in the end I suggest that it may well be constitutional 
commitments to securing particular individual rights and liberties—both state 
and federal—that figure most critically in distinguishing between the claim 
to a remedy that Justice Batchelder rejected in Bonte, on the one hand, and 
accepted in Aranson, on the other.  While neither case was overtly about the 
dimensions of a particular constitutional right, in each instance specific 
constitutional commitments cast discrete shadows on the arguments for and 
against the recognition of a new cause of action.  The nature and depth of 
these shadows may provide some clue as to how we can reconcile two 
seemingly disparate outcomes.  
I begin, in Part I, by detailing the two decisions.  Next, in Part II, I 
discuss the methods of common law decision-making developed by 
Benjamin Cardozo in his classic work, The Nature of the Judicial Process,16 
and how those methods may be applied to the decisions of Justice Batchelder 
in Bonte and Aranson.  Here, I discuss the extent to which Justice 
Batchelder’s differing responses to the call to create a new common law 
cause of action cannot be fully explained by applying Cardozo’s framework.  
Finally, in Part III, I argue that, when we account for the effect of certain 
state constitutional individual rights commitments on the plaintiffs’ claims, a 
                                                
 12. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
 13. See, e.g., State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (N.H. 1983) (addressing the state 
constitutional claim independently and relying upon federal authority only for the guidance it 
might provide). 
 14. See John Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial 
Federalism, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 913 n.1 (1995) (defining the new judicial federalism as 
state high court decision-making “based upon provisions of state constitutions that have served 
either as independent and adequate bases, or as the only bases, for ruling on questions of 
individual rights and liberties”).  As Robert Williams has pointed out, the “new” judicial 
federalism is no longer so very new.  See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 113–14 (2009). 
 15. See Joanne Green, Justice William F. Batchelder: In His Own Words, 37 N.H.B.J. 54, 
54 (1996) (noting that Justice Batchelder’s interest in “individual rights and personal dignity” 
came “from [his] heart”). 
 16. Cardozo, supra note 1. 
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consistency in approach emerges between Justice Batchelder’s positions in 
Bonte and Aranson—a consistency that should alleviate some fears about 
decision-making based upon a “judge’s personal philosophy.”17 
 
I.  THE DECISIONS 
 
A. Bonte v. Bonte 
 
In Bonte v. Bonte,18 the New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed the 
question “whether a child born alive can maintain a cause of action in tort 
against his or her mother for the mother’s tortious conduct that caused 
prenatal injury.”19  Hit by a car when she was seven months pregnant, the 
defendant, Sharon Bonte, sustained serious injuries that required the baby to 
be delivered by emergency caesarean section. 20   Stephanie Bonte—the 
plaintiff—was born with brain damage that would require she receive 
“medical and supervisory care” for the rest of her life.21  Represented by her 
father, the plaintiff sought recovery for negligence, claiming the defendant 
“fail[ed] to use reasonable care in crossing the street and fail[ed] to use a 
designated crosswalk.”22  The plaintiff appealed from a judgment for the 
defendant on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.23 
The court, with Justice Steven Thayer writing for the majority, first 
addressed the question “whether a child born alive may maintain a cause of 
action for injuries sustained while the child was in utero.”24  The court noted 
precedent allowing such actions, so as not to deny children the right to 
recover for injuries that would affect them for life simply because they were 
not yet born when they sustained the injuries.25  At the same time, precedent 
did not define against whom an action could be brought for damages suffered 
in utero; nor did it differentiate between injuries sustained by a mother and 
those sustained by a child in utero.26 
The court next addressed the question “whether [a] child may maintain 
an action against his or her mother,” looking at the history of actions by 
children against a parent for negligence.27  Historically, New Hampshire 
                                                
 17. HENNESSEY, supra note 2, at 63. 
 18.  616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992). 
 19. Id. at 464. 
 20. Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Bonte, 616 A.2d at 464–65. 
 25. Id. at 465. 
 26. See generally Bennett v. Hymers, 147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958). 
 27. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 465. 
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courts relied upon the doctrine of “parental immunity,” the principle that an 
unemancipated minor could not maintain an action against a parent for bodily 
injury caused by the parent’s negligence, a doctrine founded in the court’s 
commitment to preserve “the repose of families and the best interests of 
society.”28  In a case called Levesque v. Levesque,29 the plaintiff filed suit 
against his father for injuries sustained when the father negligently operated 
the vehicle in which they were riding.  The Levesque court noted the wide 
availability of car insurance to account for a monetary award in such cases, 
but ruled against “creat[ing] a right of action where none would otherwise 
exist.”30 
Later, in a case called Dean v. Smith,31 the court moved away from the 
doctrine of parental immunity and allowed a minor plaintiff to sue his 
deceased father’s estate for his father’s negligence in operating the vehicle in 
which they were riding.32  The court again noted that the existence of 
insurance should not create a right of action, but this time found that the 
presence of insurance should be taken into account when considering 
whether an unemancipated child could sue a parent for negligence, because it 
would lessen the possibility that an award would “disrupt family harmony” 
or greatly affect the family financially.33 
The Bonte court then looked at a case called Briere v. Briere, which 
abolished the doctrine of parental immunity entirely.34  Again, the issue was 
whether unemancipated children could sue their father for injuries sustained 
when he negligently operated the vehicle in which they were riding.35  This 
time, the court found inadequate the arguments that such immunity would 
preserve “family harmony” and not strain the family financially,36 and that 
the “prevalence of insurance [could not] be ignored.”37  The court concluded 
it would be unfair to deny children “a right commonly enjoyed by all other 
individuals,”38 and that it was not consistent to deny this right while allowing 
recovery for claims of contract or property rights.39  
 
                                                
 28. Levesque v. Levesque, 106 A.2d 563 (N.H. 1954), overruled by Briere v. Briere, 224 
A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 564. 
 31. 211 A.2d 410 (N.H. 1965). 
 32. Id. at 412–13. 
 33. Id. at 413. 
 34. Briere, 224 A.2d at 591. 
 35. Id. at 589. 
 36. Id. at 590. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 591. 
 39. Id. 
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The Bonte majority tied together these doctrinal threads.  It reasoned 
that, because children may have a cause of action against their parents for 
negligence, and because the court already sanctioned a cause of action for 
negligence for injuries sustained in utero, a child may also have a cause of 
action against a mother for negligent acts that injure the child in utero.40  
The majority rejected the defendant’s argument that such a cause of 
action violated public policy, based upon the unique relationship between a 
pregnant woman and her unborn child.41  The majority acknowledged the 
uniqueness of this relationship but found that it was not sufficient to keep the 
court from recognizing a legal duty of a mother to her fetus.42  “If a child has 
a cause of action against his or her mother for negligence that occurred after 
birth and that caused injury to the child,” the majority concluded, it would be 
illogical and contrary to precedent, “to disallow that child’s claim against the 
mother for negligent conduct that caused injury to the child months, days or 
mere hours before the child’s birth.”43  
The majority also rejected the defendant’s assertion that such an action 
would “deprive[] women of the right to control their lives during pregnancy  
. . . [and] unfairly subject[] them to unlimited liability for unintended and 
often unforeseen consequences of every day living.” 44  The majority 
concluded that the duty of care required by a pregnant woman toward her 
unborn child was no different than that of a third person to the fetus, or of a 
mother to a child after the child is born.45 
Justice William Johnson, concurring specially, agreed with the dissent’s 
emphasis on the unique and sensitive component of the relationship between 
a mother and her unborn child and that such cases should be examined in 
detail, with a “careful, case-by-case development of the law.”46  Nonetheless, 
he concurred in the holding that the breach of a duty in this instance created a 
foreseeable harm to the child that should be deemed actionable.47 
Chief Justice David Brock and Justice Batchelder jointly dissented.  In 
their view, the majority did not give sufficient weight to the “privacy and 
physical autonomy rights of women” and what its holding would mean “for 
all women in th[e] state who are, or may, become pregnant.”48  While the 
extension of liability to a mother might follow from the existence of third-
party liability, the question whether “to subject the day-to-day decisions and 
                                                
 40. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 466. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 466 (Johnson, J., concurring specially). 
 47. Id. at 467. 
 48. Id. (Brock, C.J., and Batchelder, J., dissenting). 
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acts of a woman concerning her pregnancy to judicial scrutiny” is not one 
properly “to be decided by a mechanical application of logic.”49 
Third parties must exercise a particular standard of care in regard to 
other persons, and extending this duty to unborn children “does not 
significantly restrict the behavior or actions of the defendant beyond the 
limitations already imposed.”50  In other words, third parties could “continue 
to act much as they did before the cause of action was recognized.”51  But 
this is not the case when the same duty is imposed upon the mother: she will 
now have to constrain her actions based upon legal standards, where 
previously she was guided by her “sense of personal responsibility and 
moral, not legal, obligation to her fetus.”52  
And, the dissenters continued, there is “no existing legal duty analogous 
to this one, which could govern such details of a woman’s life as her diet, 
sleep, exercise, sexual activity, work and living environment, and, of course, 
nearly every aspect of her health care.”53  Women carry children, after all, 
not because it is their fault, but because “it is a fact of life.”54  The standard 
of liability created by the majority would compel a court to scrutinize in 
every case whether the pregnancy was planned, at what point in the 
pregnancy it became known to the woman, and the woman’s financial 
situation. 55   “Such after-the-fact judicial scrutiny of the subtle and 
complicated factors affecting a women’s pregnancy may make life for 
women who are pregnant or who are merely contemplating pregnancy 
intolerable.”56 
The dissenters recognized a child’s valid interest in being born “free of 
negligently inflicted prenatal injuries and his or her right to recover for such 
harm,” and the dissenters made clear they were not addressing injuries by the 
negligent acts of the mother that “may not directly implicate the unique 
relationship between mother and fetus.” 57   Rather, the dissenters were 
concerned “that a rule of law attempting to distinguish between acts of the 
mother that involve privacy interests and those that may be considered 
common torts would result in arbitrary line-drawing resulting in inconsistent 
verdicts.”58  Accordingly, “as a matter of both judicial and public policy,” 
they would “decline to recognize a cause of action by a child born alive 
                                                
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 467. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 468 (quotation omitted). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 468. 
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against his or her mother for the mother’s negligent acts resulting in prenatal 
injury.”59 
 
B. Aranson v. Schroeder 
 
Aranson v. Schroeder, 60  decided just three years after Bonte, also 
involved the question whether the New Hampshire Supreme Court should 
recognize a new cause of action.  The case began when the Town of Conway 
sued Mark and Kathy Aranson and the Woodland Road Realty Trust (“the 
trust”) for allegedly selling a condominium without the legally required 
certificate of occupancy.61  Robert Schroeder represented the trust in the suit 
brought by the town, but the Aransons sought their own counsel and counter-
claimed on the grounds that they were not aware the certificate was required 
or that any aspect of the transaction was not legally compliant.  They sought 
rescission, as well as treble damages.62  The town won its suit against the 
Aransons and the trust, and the Aransons prevailed on their claim against the 
trust and trustees.63  The trust and the trustees appealed the award and the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed.64  
The Aransons sought to enforce their judgment in Massachusetts but 
had not “collected a farthing”65 from the defendants when they filed a new 
action in New Hampshire, asking the Superior Court to “recognize a cause of 
action for the tort of malicious defense, define its elements, and determine 
whether an attorney’s law firm is also subject to liability.”66  “In effect,” the 
court noted, the Aransons—now plaintiffs in this new suit—sought “an 
aspect of tort reform, the recognition at common law of a remedy where” 
none had existed.67   The trial court found to be false defendant John 
Thompson’s claim that Mr. Aranson had said he checked on the permit and 
that everything was “all set”; the court also concluded that defendant 
Schroeder falsified a document in support of this allegation, a document 
likely created after the Aransons filed their counterclaim.68  The court also 
found that the Aransons did not know about the permit requirement until the 
town sued them, concluding that the plaintiffs would not have purchased the 
                                                
 59. Id. 
 60. 671 A.2d 1023 (N.H. 1995). 
 61. Id. at 1025. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1025. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1026. 
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property had the lack of a permit been known to them.69 
The Aransons argued for the creation of a new cause of action—a claim 
for malicious defense that would be, in essence, a “mirror image of § 674 of 
the Restatement (2d),” the already recognized tort of malicious prosecution 
or false claim.70  The Aransons maintained the state of the law was unfair, as 
it “condemn[ed] false evidence from the plaintiff’s side but arguably 
tolerat[ed] it from the defendant’s side.”71  Both forms of misconduct, the 
Aransons concluded, “should be condemned, and made the subject of 
damages.”72  The lower court did not rule on the Aransons’ claim, instead 
transferring the case to the Supreme Court with three questions of law: (1) 
Does a cause of action exist against a person who allegedly created false 
material evidence while acting as defense counsel in a previous case and, 
after withdrawing as counsel, allegedly gave false testimony advancing such 
evidence?  (2) If so, what are the elements of such a new cause of action?  (3) 
Does such cause of action also exist against such counsel’s firm?73 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, with Justice Batchelder writing for 
the majority, first reviewed the factors it would consider in determining 
whether to recognize a new cause of action.74  As an initial matter, there is 
the question “whether the interest that the plaintiffs assert should receive any 
legal recognition.”75  If it should, the next question is “whether the relief that 
the plaintiffs request would be an appropriate way to recognize it.”76  While 
conducting this inquiry, the majority acknowledged that it should be mindful 
of Part I, article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which provides to 
every citizen “a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all 
injuries he may receive in his person, property, or character.”77  
The majority noted that no new action should be created if an action 
already existed that could provide the same remedy.78  In this case, the only 
claim available to the plaintiffs, absent the creation of a malicious defense 
cause of action, was one for sanctions to attorneys engaged in the improper 
conduct.79  But that remedy, the majority continued, would not provide the 
Aransons the damages they sought—namely, “consequential and special 
                                                
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1026. 
 73. Id. at 1025. 
 74. See id. at 1026 (quoting Rockhouse Mountain Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Town of 
Conway, 503 A.2d 1385, 1387–88 (N.H. 1986)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (quoting N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XIV).  
 78. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1026–27. 
 79. Id. at 1027. 
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damages, costs, interest, attorney’s fees, and enhanced compensatory 
damages—the same damages to which they would have been entitled in a 
successful suit for malicious prosecution.”80  Asking whether plaintiffs are 
“less aggrieved when the groundless claim put forth in the courts is done 
defensively rather than affirmatively in asserting a worthless lawsuit,” the 
majority concluded they are not, and that the tort of malicious defense should 
be adopted.81 
The defendants contended that no such action had ever been adopted, but 
the majority pointed to cases in South Carolina and California in which 
courts found some form of damages for a false defense to be appropriate.82  
As well, the majority recognized the anxiety and uncertainty that 
accompanies litigation.83  “Here,” the majority stated, though the Aransons 
“prevailed in their lawsuit, they did so at a price—in time, money, and 
uncertainty—that was substantially exacerbated by the alleged actions of 
Schroeder.  If a factual predicate exists to support liability and a measure of 
the damages thus exacerbated, the plaintiffs are entitled to a remedy to that 
extent.”84  In other words, “upon proving malicious defense, the aggrieved 
party is entitled to the same damages as are recoverable in a malicious 
prosecution claim.”85 
At the same time, the majority made clear that “the mere existence of a 
remedy for malicious defense will not serve as a license for its abuse.”86  
Malicious defense, the majority reasoned, should be a “limited cause of 
action that will lie only in discrete circumstances.”87  The court indicated it 
would not tolerate such claims as a means by which plaintiffs could seek to 
interfere with procedure or to intimidate, to limit discovery, or as a recourse 
when they are “merely dissatisfied with a monetary judgment.”88 
Next, the majority addressed the elements of a malicious defense claim.  
Here, it adopted a standard with elements that “essentially mirror those 
required to prove the tort of malicious prosecution”:89  
 
 
                                                
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (citing Cisson v. Pickens, 186 S.E.2d 822, 825 (S.C. 1972); Bertero v. Nat’l Gen. 
Corp., 529 P.2d 608, 616 (Cal. 1975)).  
 83. See id. at 1028 (stating that litigation is a “disturbing influence” and causes 
“uncertainty”). 
 84. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1028. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1029. 
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One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, 
or procurement of the defense of a civil proceeding is subject 
to liability for all harm proximately caused, including 
reasonable attorneys’ fees, if[:]  
 
(a) he or she acts without probable cause, i.e., without any 
credible basis in fact and such action is not warranted by 
existing law or established equitable principles or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law,  
 
(b) with knowledge or notice of the lack of merit in such 
actions, 
 
(c) primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the 
proper adjudication of the claim and defense thereto, such as 
to harass, annoy or injure, or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation, 
(d) the previous proceedings are terminated in favor of the 
party bringing the malicious defense action, and 
 
(e) injury or damage is sustained.90 
 
The majority particularly noted the importance of the termination of 
previous proceedings in favor of the party asserting the malicious defense 
claim.91  As in the context of a malicious prosecution claim, this requirement 
serves to avoid inconsistent verdicts and unnecessary litigation; a plaintiff 
who loses in the original action should be barred from instituting a malicious 
defense claim because a judgment in favor of the defendant demonstrates that 
he acted with probable cause—a malicious defense claim should not be a 
means by which plaintiffs can reopen judgments.92  
Justice Thayer dissented, in the belief that the majority’s holding was 
“unwise as a matter of policy.”93  Justice Thayer argued that the defendants 
were not claiming the Aransons had no cause of action, but that creating a 
                                                
 90. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1028–29 (quoting Jonathan K. Van Patten & Robert E. Willard, 
The Limits of Advocacy: A Proposal for the Tort of Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35 
HASTINGS L.J. 891, 933–34 (1984)). 
 91. See id. at 1029 (explaining the importance of the termination requirement and finding 
“no reason why” it should not “equally appl[y]” to a malicious defense claim). 
 92. Id.  The court did not address the third transferred question for lack of evidence on the 
record, leaving that determination for the trial court. 
 93. Id. at 1031 (Thayer, J., dissenting). 
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“separate cause of action for malicious defense [was not] an appropriate 
recognition of this interest.”94  He argued that a separate action was not 
appropriate for two reasons: first, because the Aransons already had 
“adequate remedies” available to them; and, second, because of the 
significant differences between a malicious claim and a malicious defense, 
which justified “the existing discrepancy in remedies.”95  
As to the first reason, Thayer enumerated the existing remedies 
available to the Aransons, including an award of attorney’s fees and 
sanctions for related “out-of-pocket expenses,” as well as “statutory costs,” 
which he believed would be sufficient compensation for a plaintiff faced with 
a false defense.96  Thayer also pointed to the possibility of holding the 
defendant’s attorney “personally liable for counsel fees,”97 citing the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in Keenan v. Fearon, in which the 
court held the plaintiff’s lawyer liable for the defendant’s attorney’s fees 
after filing an appeal without the plaintiff’s consent.98  In addition, Thayer 
noted the opportunity for the court to set aside a “fraudulently obtained 
judgment.”99  Finally, Thayer discussed “the possibility of criminal sanctions 
where perjury is part of the malicious defense,” as well as “the threat of 
professional disciplinary proceedings,” though he acknowledged that neither 
of these actions would provide direct relief to plaintiffs.100        
While Justice Thayer did not dispute that a disparity exists between the 
potential recovery for malicious prosecution and for malicious defense,101 he 
justified that disparity by the differing injuries.  While defendants are 
unwillingly brought into court, plaintiffs willingly initiate suits; thus,  
 
[u]nlike the defendant targeted by a malicious prosecution, 
the plaintiff who encounters a malicious defense voluntarily 
entered the judicial system and must be held to accept, to 
some degree, the costs and risks of litigation.  When this 
plaintiff ultimately prevails in the action, at best only a 
portion of the plaintiff’s litigation costs and damages can be 
attributed to the malicious defense.102 
 
 
                                                
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1031. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (citing Keenan v. Fearon, 543 A.2d 1379, 1383 (N.H. 1988)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 1032. 
 102. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1032. 
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Further, Justice Thayer pointed to the possibility of increased and 
unwarranted litigation,103 arguing that plaintiffs dissatisfied with the amount 
of a judgment may use the action to “augment their recovery,” and if a 
defendant is “judgment-proof,” plaintiffs might use the action to recover 
from the defendant’s lawyers instead.104  Thayer also noted the possibility 
that the tort could undermine a defendant’s ability to mount a “vigorous 
defense” in fear that such an effort would later be deemed “malicious.”105  
Such an action, moreover, would be inconsistent with the rule that 
“statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely 
privileged from civil actions, provided they are pertinent to the subject of the 
proceeding,”106 and Thayer noted that even when the defendant “inject[ed]     
. . . privileged material itself into the case,” a waiver of confidentiality might 
have a detrimental effect on attorney-client privilege.107  He also observed 
that in most cases, it would be a plaintiff claiming the defendant was liable 
for part or all of their attorney’s fees, which would inevitably require a 
determination as to the portion of the fees tied to the malicious defense and a 
“highly invasive review of documents normally protected by the attorney-
client privilege.”108  Concluding that the addition of a cause of action for 
malicious defense to New Hampshire’s common law was undesirable, Justice 
Thayer noted that not only had no other jurisdiction in the country 
recognized such an action, but courts in other jurisdictions had explicitly 
rejected it.109   
 
C.  Are Justice Batchelder’s Positions in Bonte and Aranson Consistent? 
 
To review: both Bonte and Aranson involved arguments about a novel 
cause of action: in Bonte, the plaintiff sought relief by imposing liability on 
his mother for her negligent actions when he was in utero; in Aranson, the 
plaintiffs sought relief by imposing liability on opposing counsel in a 
previous case for his actions in that litigation.  So characterized, the claims in 
these cases generally appear similar, each in its way seeking, in the words of 
the state constitutional guarantee, “a certain remedy . . . for . . . injuries.”110  
And in this light, Justice Batchelder’s positions in each appear to be in direct 
opposition, as he voted to deny Bonte an opportunity to seek relief and 
                                                
 103. See id. (stating that the action could motivate future litigation in a way previously not 
recognized). 
 104. Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107.  Id. at 1032–33. 
 108. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1033. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1026 (quoting N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XIV). 
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approved the Aransons’ bid to do the same. 
But I want to argue here that, in fact, Justice Batchelder acted 
consistently in each case.  If judicial legitimacy is premised to some extent 
upon the value of consistency, then it behooves us to determine whether 
Justice Batchelder got it right when he reached different results in a pair of 
cases in which the court was asked to recognize a new common law cause of 
action.  These are the instances, as Chief Justice Hennessey recognized, in 
which the third branch is going about the business of making law—instances, 
in other words, when we ought to pay close attention to whether judges are 
making decisions based upon their personal philosophies, rather than upon 
objectively verifiable principles.111  
To show why I believe Justice Batchelder’s positions are consistent in 
Bonte and Aranson requires a framework for charting the possible 
approaches to common law decision-making.  The classic understanding of 
the way in which state judges go about their business comes from Benjamin 
Cardozo and his lectures on the judicial process.112  In the next Part, I review 
Cardozo’s framework and use it to evaluate Justice Batchelder’s decisions in 
Bonte and Aranson to determine whether they are consistent despite their 
different outcomes.  
 
II.  BONTE, ARANSON, AND THE METHODS OF COMMON LAW  
DECISION-MAKING 
 
In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Benjamin Cardozo sought to shed 
light on the principles that guide judicial discretion.113  The judge, he argued, 
“must first extract from the precedents the underlying principle, the ratio 
decidendi; he must then determine the path or direction along which the 
principle is to move and develop, if it is not to whither and die.”114  Even 
after a principle has been identified, “[t]he problem remains to fix the bounds 
and the tendencies of development and growth, to set the directive force in 
motion along the right path at the parting of the ways.”115 
In addressing this problem, Cardozo identified four interpretive avenues 
available to a judge: (1) the path of logic—what Cardozo called “the rule of 
analogy or the method of philosophy”; (2) the path of historical development, 
what he called “the method of evolution”; (3) the path of the customs of the 
community, which he called “the method of tradition”; and (4) the path of 
                                                
 111. See HENNESSEY, supra note 2, at 2–3 (stating common law decision-making is one of 
the areas in which “the legitimacy of the court is problematic”). 
 112. See generally Cardozo, supra note 1. 
 113. See id. at 19. 
 114. Id. at 28. 
 115. Id. at 30. 
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justice, morals and social welfare, which he called “the method of 
sociology.”116  In what follows, I explore each of these alternatives and seek 
to determine which, if any, support the consistency of Justice Batchelder’s 
decisions in Bonte and Aranson. 
 
A. The Method of Philosophy 
 
The method of philosophy, Cardozo explained, enjoys “the primacy that 
comes from natural and orderly and logical succession.”117  It of course “will 
not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and 
the opposite way between another,”118 he wrote, and logic ought to control if 
“the affairs of men are to be governed with the serene and impartial 
uniformity which is of the essence of the idea of law.”119 
The majority opinion in Bonte neatly illustrates a purely logical 
approach to common law decision-making.  Justice Thayer determined, first, 
that precedent supported a cause of action by a child against a parent; and, 
second, that precedent supported a cause of action for negligence for injuries 
sustained in utero.120  Faced with a claim by a child for negligence against his 
mother for injuries suffered while she was pregnant with him, Justice Thayer 
concluded that this was simply a variation on specific actions the court had 
already sanctioned in respect to the injury allegedly suffered and the potential 
for a remedy.121  Justice Thayer’s reasoning may be (crudely) diagrammed 
thus: (x1 + x2 = y), where x is a valid, previously-recognized cause of action. 
But while this diagram illustrates the role of logic in consistent decision-
making, it also shows that the Bonte majority’s perspective on the precedents 
and the issues in the case could be seen as fairly reductive.  In The Nature of 
the Judicial Process, Cardozo warned that pure logic will take us only so 
far.122  Some cases, for example, will present two plausible and logical paths, 
requiring that we “make a choice between [logical paths].”123  And in other 
cases, reliance upon logic may threaten to become an end unto itself, 
blinding a judge to the other possibilities: “The misuse of logic . . . begins,” 
Cardozo stated, “when its method and its ends are treated as supreme and 
final.”124 
Indeed, the dissenters in Bonte acknowledged the force of the majority’s 
                                                
 116. Id. at 30–31. 
 117. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 31. 
 118. Id. at 33. 
 119. Id. at 36. 
 120. See Bonte, 616 A.2d at 466. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 43. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 46. 
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logic, but they nonetheless saw that path as leading to future problems—
namely, the possibility that “the day-to-day decisions and acts of a woman 
concerning her pregnancy” could be subjected “to judicial scrutiny.”125  And 
yet, in Aranson, Justice Batchelder—now writing for the majority—relied 
upon the kind of formulaic logic employed in Bonte to conclude that the 
court should embrace a new cause of action for malicious defense: if the only 
remedy available to an aggrieved plaintiff were sanctions, he reasoned, and if 
that remedy could not provide plaintiff a full recovery, and if damages were 
available when a party was equally aggrieved by a malicious prosecution, it 
followed that the court should adopt the tort of malicious defense.126  Here, 
Justice Batchelder’s conclusion may be diagrammed thus: (x = y), where x is 
an action for malicious prosecution and y an action for malicious defense.  
This diagram of the reasoning in Aranson is no less reductive than the 
diagram of Justice Thayer’s reasoning in Bonte; an examination of Cardozo’s 
method of philosophy—the path of logic—has moved us no closer to 
understanding how Justice Batchelder’s positions in Bonte and Aranson 
could be viewed as consistent.  Logical reasoning is a hallmark of 
consistency and, therefore, judicial legitimacy, but, as Cardozo labored to 
explain, it is not the sole means by which a judge determines which path the 
law will follow.  In the many cases in which logic proves inadequate to the 
complexities of determining the law’s path, Cardozo argued that “[h]istory or 
custom of social utility or some compelling sentiment of justice or sometimes 
perhaps a semi-intuitive apprehension of the pervading spirit of our law must 
come to the rescue of the anxious judge, and tell him where to go.”127 
 
B. The Methods of History and Custom 
 
History, Cardozo argued, may confine and direct the path of logic: “the 
effect of history is to make the path of logic clear.”128  He meant that 
“history, in illuminating the past, illuminates the present, and in illuminating 
the present, illuminates the future.”129  What has come before, in other words, 
may give a judge a good indication of whether a rule or set of rules has 
proved adequate to the task for which it was designed, or whether a 
modification is in order.  
The method of history so understood, it seems clear that a resort to 
history will not provide the connecting link between Justice Batchelder’s 
positions in Bonte and Aranson.  Recall that in each case, the plaintiff sought 
                                                
 125. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 467 (Brock, C.J., and Batchelder, J., dissenting). 
 126. Aranson, 671 A.2d 1023, 1027 (N.H. 1995). 
 127. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 43. 
 128. Id. at 51. 
 129. Id. at 53. 
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a rule that would allow a remedy for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of 
certain actions by the defendant, and which presumably would deter such 
injurious actions in the future.  In Bonte, the dissenters denied that the 
relevant history—the evolution in negligence law that came to allow both 
actions by children against their parents and by children against third parties 
for injuries suffered in utero—was apposite. 130   Indeed, they argued 
essentially that this history revealed nothing about the potential consequences 
of exposing women to potential liability to their own children while they are 
in utero.131 
In Aranson, by contrast, Justice Batchelder relied upon the historically 
favorable experience with the tort of malicious prosecution to bolster the 
argument for adopting the tort of malicious defense.132   Given that the 
wronged party is similarly aggrieved in each instance, he saw no reason why 
liability should not exist for the wrong of malicious defense just as it does for 
malicious prosecution.133  To the extent Justice Batchelder’s positions in 
Bonte and Aranson may be seen as consistent, it is not because he found the 
path of history to be persuasive in each case: in one, he rejected favorable 
history as essentially irrelevant; in the other, he embraced it.  
“If,” Cardozo continued, “history and philosophy do not serve to fix the 
direction of a principle, custom may step in.”134  But custom is less relevant 
“in the making of new rules as in the application of old ones.”135  In both the 
cases under discussion here, the court was concerned with the making of new 
rules, and custom—the ways in which the rules have over time come to 
work—provides little guidance in evaluating the consistency of Justice 
Batchelder’s decisions in these cases. 
 
C. The Method of Sociology 
 
“The final cause of law,” Cardozo observed, “is the welfare of 
society.”136  He continued: 
 
Logic and history and custom have their place.  We will 
shape the law to conform to them when we may; but only 
within bounds.  The end which the law serves will dominate 
them all. . . . [When judges] are called upon to say how far 
                                                
 130. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 467. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1028. 
 133. Id. at 1029. 
 134. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 58. 
 135. Id. at 62. 
 136. Id. at 66. 
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existing rules are to be extended or restricted, they must let 
the welfare of society fix the path, its direction and its 
distance.137 
 
By “social welfare,” Cardozo meant, “what is commonly spoken of as 
public policy, the good of the collective body.”138  Judges accordingly should 
move away from “the conception of a lawsuit as either a mathematical 
problem or a sportsman’s game,” and think “of the end which the law serves, 
and fitting its rules to the task of service.”139  Within the limits of their 
discretion, “within the range over which choice moves, the final principle of 
selection for judges, as for legislators, is one of fitness to an end.”140  
Still, judgments must be justified under “objective or external 
standards,” lest they become “a jurisprudence of mere sentiment or 
feeling.” 141   Objective principles ought to provide for “symmetrical 
development” in the common law, consistent with “history or custom when 
history or custom has been the motive force, or the chief one, in giving shape 
to existing rules, and with logic or philosophy when the motive power has 
been theirs.”142  “Symmetrical development,” however, “may be bought at 
too high a price.  Uniformity ceases to be a good when it becomes uniformity 
of oppression.  The social interest served by symmetry or certainty must then 
be balanced against the social interest served by equity and fairness or other 
elements of social welfare.”143  
The problem is that judges must discern the point at which the interest 
in symmetrical development becomes associated with “uniformity of 
oppression.”  Cardozo suggested that the judge will know “when one interest 
outweighs another” from his or her “experience and study and reflection; in 
brief, from life itself.”144  Cardozo had great faith in the abilities of judges: 
“if they act with conscience and intelligence, they ought to attain in their 
conclusions a fair average of truth and wisdom.”145  
Here we have a method of judicial decision-making with which we can 
attempt to reconcile Justice Batchelder’s positions in Bonte and Aranson: the 
method of sociology, the directive to safeguard social justice when its value 
would be denied by the operation of logic and history.  Thus in Bonte the 
dissenters could have viewed the logical creation of a cause of action for a 
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child against his mother for her negligent acts while he was in utero as 
oppressive to women, potentially subjecting a mother’s every decision to 
judicial scrutiny.  And in Aranson, Justice Batchelder could have viewed the 
creation of a cause of action for malicious defense as means by which to 
prevent the oppression of plaintiffs who otherwise would have no recourse 
against the malicious actions of defendants in litigation. 
Notwithstanding Cardozo’s faith in the intelligence and conscience of 
judges, this reconciliation of Justice Batchelder’s positions in Bonte and 
Aranson depends upon agreement with an unspecified notion of social 
justice.  Notably, the state constitution itself, in Part I, article 14, supplied the 
court and the litigants in these cases with a quite specific notion of social 
justice—that every citizen shall have “a certain remedy, by having recourse 
to the laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or 
character.”146  A conscientious judge, seeking to achieve social justice in 
these cases and aware of the outermost limits on a judge’s ability to 
innovate,147 need look no further: in addition to the logic and history of 
precedent, Part I, Article 14 suggests that the end of social justice may be 
secured through the provision in the common law of remedies for injuries, 
which in each of these cases would have warranted the recognition of a new 
cause of action. 
And so Justice Batchelder’s decisions in Bonte and Aranson still appear 
to point in different directions.  Is it possible to explain the apparently 
inconsistent regard for the premise of Article 14 in each?  Perhaps Justice 
Batchelder recognized the import of the constitutional promise of a remedy 
for all injuries in Aranson, but not in Bonte, because he (along with Chief 
Justice Brock) saw the potential for oppression in lawsuits by children 
against their mothers for injuries suffered from her negligence while they 
were in utero as a greater injustice than the lack of a remedy for children in 
that situation.  In this light, Justice Batchelder’s position in Bonte could be 
viewed as idiosyncratic—as a product of the peculiar facts of the case—and 
yet just, in the sense that the potential harm to women outweighed the 
plaintiff child’s competing interest. 
Whether it would have satisfied Cardozo, this explanation might not save 
Justice Batchelder from the charge that his position in Bonte was motivated 
by a personal philosophical objection to the majority’s conclusion.  Why, for 
instance, should the interest in protecting mothers be accorded greater weight 
than the interest in providing a remedy for their children?  As a general 
matter, moreover, we should prefer that decisions in similar cases involving 
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similar claims be reconciled—if at all possible—for in such consistency lies 
not just a sound basis for viewing judicial lawmaking as legitimate, but 
guidance for lawyers and judges wrestling with similar issues in the future.  
In respect to Bonte and Aranson, logic, history, and sociology do not, either 
alone or together, get us there.  But accounting for the potential influence of 
other constitutional concerns—that is, concerns beyond Article 14—just 
might, as I explain in the next Part. 
 
III.  ACCOUNTING FOR CONSTITUTIONAL SHADOWS 
 
As noted above, Part I, Article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution 
guarantees to each individual “a certain remedy, by having recourse to the 
laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or character.”148  
This commitment has been interpreted by the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court as serving two purposes: “to make civil remedies readily available, and 
to guard against arbitrary and discriminatory infringement on access to the 
courts.”149  The court has held that these rights “are necessarily relative,”150 
and that Article 14 “does not guarantee that all infringed persons will receive 
full compensation for their injuries.”151 
By its terms, Article 14 does not compel the courts of New Hampshire 
to create new causes of action upon request.152  But, as discussed above, it 
does give a constitutional imprimatur to a particular social justice value—
namely, the value in providing at least an opportunity for individuals to 
demonstrate they are entitled to a remedy for injuries they have suffered.  In 
a much earlier case, Justice Batchelder noted that the law has long 
“endeavored to provide rational remedies to those persons whose lot in life 
has taken a detrimental turn as a result of the conduct of others who have 
breached a duty owed to the injured party.”153 
Thus Article 14 casts a distinct shadow on the judicial determination 
whether to create a new cause of action.  To be clear, this is not the “shadow 
of the law” that necessarily influences the strategic behavior of parties in 
litigation to push for either settlement or trial.154  It is, rather, a constitutional 
marker, one that suggests that, in appropriate cases, a court should consider 
the implications of leaving individuals without an opportunity to seek a 
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remedy.  As Justice Batchelder observed in Aranson, a court ought to “keep 
in mind”155 Article 14 when it considers whether to recognize a plaintiff’s 
interest in relief and whether the relief requested would be appropriate.156 
Justice Batchelder’s decision in Aranson expressly reflects the impulse 
to “keep in mind” Article 14’s mandate.  Nonetheless, as discussed above, 
Article 14’s shadow does not, in itself, provide the key to reconciling his 
positions in Bonte and Aranson, for that shadow leans in just one direction: 
toward the path favoring judicial recognition of a legitimate need for the 
common law to provide individuals a remedy.  In Bonte, of course, Justice 
Batchelder and Chief Justice Brock criticized their colleagues in the majority 
for following this very path.157 
But in Bonte, unlike in Aranson, Article 14 was not the only 
constitutional provision to cast a shadow on the determination whether to 
recognize a new cause of action.  A constitution, after all, will often embrace 
numerous values of differing dimensions, some of which may be in tension 
with others.  Once we accept the possibility that a court, in deciding whether 
to recognize a new action, may need to account for both the value that 
inheres in the availability of a remedy and another, competing value, the way 
is made clear to see the consistency in Justice Batchelder’s decisions in 
Bonte and Aranson.  Indeed, on this view, the difference between the 
decisions comes down to one fact: the shadow over the determination in 
Bonte cast by another, arguably superior constitutional value.158  
 Recall that, in their dissenting opinion in Bonte, Chief Justice Brock and 
Justice Batchelder criticized the majority for discounting “the problems 
associated with legally recognizing a mother’s duty to her fetus,” and 
questioned whether it was “possible to subject a woman’s judgment, action, 
and behavior as they relate to the well-being of her fetus to a judicial 
determination of reasonableness in a manner that is consistent and free from 
arbitrary results.”159  They explained that the nature and scope of the duty 
recognized by the majority would involve extensive “after-the-fact judicial 
scrutiny of the subtle and complicated factors affecting a woman’s 
pregnancy,” scrutiny that could “make life for women who are pregnant or 
who are merely contemplating pregnancy intolerable.”160  For these reasons, 
the dissenters believed the duty of a mother to her unborn child should 
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“remain a moral obligation which, for the vast majority of women, is already 
freely recognized and respected without compulsion by law.”161  
The dissenters did not explore in detail the pedigree of the “privacy 
interests”162 they argued would be undermined by the majority’s newly-
created duty to the unborn child, but it requires no great stretch to connect 
these interests to the individual autonomy rights protected under the United 
States Constitution.  Indeed, the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided 
Bonte just months after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision 
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 163  in which it reaffirmed the core 
constitutional principles recognized in Roe v. Wade. 164   In Casey, the 
plurality opinion made clear that the U.S. Constitution has long protected, 
and would continue to protect, “a realm of personal liberty which the 
government may not enter,”165 a realm which includes aspects of individual 
and intimate decision-making regarding procreation, family, and parenthood, 
and which includes a woman’s right to choose.166  
The constitutional implications of the rule adopted by the Bonte 
majority might have been more apparent had the state legislature enacted it.  
In a challenge to such a law, a court would need to determine, as an initial 
matter, whether the rule implicated a fundamental right, which would in turn 
trigger some form of heightened judicial scrutiny.167  To this end, the court 
would ask whether the asserted interest was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and traditions, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.”168  The first 
inquiry addresses the historical support the interest has received in American 
law; the second seeks to ascertain whether, if this interest were not deemed to 
be fundamental, the most basic sense of liberty in our constitutional republic 
would be at risk. 
What is the specific interest implicated by the Bonte majority’s rule?  It 
can be described as the freedom of a woman, during the course of her 
pregnancy, to make without fear of sanction the innumerable everyday 
decisions that potentially could affect her well-being or that of her unborn 
child.  These are decisions about such mundane matters as whether to drive 
an automobile, or to ride a bicycle, or even to walk across a street.  This kind 
of decision-making ordinarily is subject only to generalized regulation—for 
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instance, the requirement that all drivers possess a valid license.169 
Turning first to the nation’s history and legal traditions, it seems clear 
that the common law regulation of pregnant women through the availability 
of a negligence action is a relatively recent phenomenon.170  Further, there is 
little evidence supporting the view that at the time of the framing of either 
the U.S. Constitution in 1787 or the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867—much 
less the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784—the unborn could bring a 
civil suit against their mothers for the consequences of her negligent acts 
during the course of the pregnancy.  As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in 
Roe v. Wade, the text of the federal constitution does not suggest that the 
unborn should be considered “persons” within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, much less that they are a specially protected class.171 
Further, a woman’s interest in making everyday decisions about how 
she will live her life could be seen as implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.  The autonomy to, for example, move about freely—to decide where 
to go and how to get there, restricted only by the regulations that affect all 
persons—would seem to be critical to the enjoyment of not just other 
constitutional liberties, but to a woman’s ability to fulfill the obligations and 
responsibilities of citizenship.  The potential for civil liability could 
effectively reduce the compass of a woman’s freedom during the course of 
her pregnancy—the world, after all, is a dangerous place to negotiate on our 
best days, and it is difficult (if not impossible) to foresee all the many ways 
in which the many hazards of everyday life potentially could result in harm 
to an unborn child.172  Regulation along the lines of the Bonte majority’s 
negligence rule would represent at least a modest step toward the world of 
Margaret Atwood’s novel, The Handmaid’s Tale, in which certain women 
consigned by the ruling elite to serve as vessels for reproduction were 
deprived the freedom to make decisions that might result in harm to the 
children they were carrying.173   
For these reasons, a court could well declare fundamental a woman’s 
interest in the ability, free from fears about potential tort liability, to make 
daily decisions while pregnant; such a conclusion would subject laws that 
undermine this interest to something more intense than mere rational-basis 
judicial scrutiny.  This interest would be implicated regardless of whether the 
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legislature or a court adopted a rule imposing liability on a woman for her 
allegedly negligent decision-making while pregnant.  
And so, like the value of a remedy embraced by Article 14, the 
constitutional value that inheres in a woman’s “privacy interests” casts a 
shadow in Bonte on the determination whether to recognize a new cause of 
action, and the court must assess the influence of these respective shadows 
on that question.174  On the one hand, the Bonte majority’s rule creates the 
potential for regulation, which could over time operate to diminish the 
autonomy of a percentage of the state’s female population for a portion of 
their lives.  On the other, a child has a legitimate interest in compensation for 
prenatal harms inflicted by a mother’s negligence.  Of course, as the Bonte 
dissenters noted, even absent a cause of action compelling her to act, the duty 
of a mother to her child “remains a moral obligation which, for the vast 
majority of women, is already freely recognized.”175  On balance, the Bonte 
dissenters reasonably could have concluded that the shadow created by the 
value of a woman’s autonomy is sufficiently deep that it, and not the value of 
a remedy, ought to bear more immediately on the determination whether to 
declare a new common law cause of action.  At a minimum, the federal 
precedent supporting the validity of a woman’s interest in autonomous 
decision-making provides an explanation for the Bonte dissenters’ objection 
to a new cause of action that rests on a ground more legitimate than that of 
personal philosophical preference. 
As this discussion indicates, the court in Aranson did not have to address 
a tension between competing values—in other words, there was no 
constitutional interest against which the Aranson court had to balance the 
plaintiff’s request for a remedy for having allegedly suffered a malicious 
defense.  In that case, Justice Batchelder could acknowledge the shadow cast 
by Article 14 and, as he once counseled, “keep in mind”176 the provision’s 
promise of “a certain remedy . . . for all injuries.”177  
That the presence of a second and arguably deeper constitutional shadow 
in Bonte allows us to reconcile that case and Aranson is supported by 
another, earlier decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, one also 
written by Justice Batchelder.  In Kingsbury v. Smith, the court addressed the 
question whether New Hampshire recognizes a claim for “wrongful birth.”178  
Justice Batchelder construed this claim as one for “‘wrongful conception,’ 
which is an action for damages arising from the birth of a child to which a 
                                                
 174. Cf. Dworkin, supra note 158, at 27 (suggesting that, when principles intersect, “one 
who must resolve the conflict has to take into account the relative weight of each”). 
 175. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 468 (Brock, C.J., and Batchelder, J., dissenting). 
 176. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1026. 
 177. N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. XIV. 
 178. 442 A.2d 1003, 1004 (N.H. 1982). 
26 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 12, No. 1 
 
negligently performed sterilization procedure, or a negligently filled birth 
control prescription which fails to prevent conception, was a contributing 
factor.” 179   His opinion for the court concluded that, assuming all the 
elements of a medical malpractice claim were present, the common law of 
New Hampshire would permit such an action.180 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Batchelder reasoned that non-
recognition of this action would “leave[] a void in the area of recovery for 
medical malpractice and dilute[] the standard of professional conduct and 
expertise in the area of family planning.”181  He was bolstered in this view by 
the fact that family planning decisions have been “clothed with constitutional 
protection,”182  citing, among other cases, Roe v. Wade and Griswold v. 
Connecticut,183 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that substantive due 
process protects certain kinds of intimate decision-making from government 
intrusion absent the most compelling interest.  
Kingsbury makes clear the consistency between Justice Batchelder’s 
decisions in Bonte and Aranson.  The connecting link is the relationship 
between the constitutional shadows at play in each case.  In Kingsbury, there 
was no tension between the value of a remedy promoted by Article 14 and 
the constitutional protection afforded procreative decision-making, for an 
action for wrongful conception could serve that autonomy interest by 
potentially deterring its private infringement.  In Bonte, however, the 
recognition of an unborn child’s claim against her mother for her negligent 
acts while she was pregnant was in tension with a woman’s interest in 
autonomous decision-making, requiring the court to determine which 
constitutional value should prevail.  Finally, in Aranson, there was no tension 
between Article 14’s promise of a remedy and any another constitutional 
interest, so Justice Batchelder could focus his analysis upon the standard 
considerations that go into determining whether to recognize a new common 




Consistency provides some assurance that particular outcomes of 
judicial lawmaking will be predictable and not arbitrary.  The goal of this 
essay was simply to see whether we could find some consistency between 
Justice Batchelder’s decisions in Bonte v. Bonte and Aranson v. Schroeder, 
where differing outcomes in what appeared to be similar situations appeared 
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to suggest the results flowed more from personal philosophy than reasoned 
legal analysis.  The key to reconciling the decisions lay in untangling the 
shadows cast by certain constitutional commitments on the judicial 
determination whether to recognize a new cause of action.  The rule of 
decision that emerges from this analysis allows us to both reconcile Justice 
Batchelder’s decisions in Bonte and Aranson and find some guidance in that 
reconciliation for future cases.  
That rule of decision requires an initial judicial inquiry into the 
constitutional implications of adopting a new cause of action.  Article 14 
supports, as a matter of state constitutional law, the creation of just remedies 
for injuries suffered; as an initial matter, a court must determine whether this 
value is in tension with another, settled constitutional interest.  Should such a 
tension be discovered, the Bonte dissent suggests it ought to be considered 
and resolved as a part of its determination whether to expand the common 
law and embrace the new claim.  When, on the other hand, such a tension 
does not exist, Aranson suggests the court should focus exclusively on the 
traditional concern of judicial lawmaking in this context—that is, whether the 
common law should “provide rational remedies to those persons whose lot in 
life has taken a detrimental turn as the result of the conduct of others.”184 
 
* * * 
In addition to his work on the bench, Justice Batchelder kept a small 
farm in his native Plymouth; there his wife tended to the sheep and he the 
fields littered with the stones that comprise many New England walls.185  
These stones found their way into his judicial writing; in one decision, he 
compared public policy to “Robert Frost’s stone wall,” which could be 
viewed “with a purpose to determine what claims are walled in and what 
claims are walled out.”186  
Given his fondness for New England’s stone walls, Justice Batchelder 
likely would have appreciated this guidance from a stonemason, as recounted 
by the writer John Jerome: 
 
Once I left a stone unstable, rocking on a high spot.  She 
spotted it immediately.  “I don’t like that and neither do 
you,” she said, pulling it down, turning it over, giving its 
underside a couple of good whacks with hammer and chisel, 
and plopping it firmly and securely in its place.187  
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As Justice Batchelder’s decisions in Bonte and Aranson demonstrate, 
common law decision-making is not entirely unlike stone work: for what are 
the judges doing but pulling out a proposed cause of action, turning it over 
and giving it some shape, so that it fits “firmly and securely in its place”—or 
concluding, upon close inspection of the ways in which constitutional 
shadows fall upon it, that this action will ultimately prove unstable, leaving 
the law “rocking on a high spot”? 
